Abstract-A (K, N, T, Kc) instance of the MDS-TPIR problem is comprised of K messages and N distributed servers. Each message is separately encoded through an (N, Kc) MDS storage code. A user wishes to retrieve one message, as efficiently as possible, while revealing no information about the desired message index to any colluding set of up to T servers. The fundamental limit on the efficiency of retrieval, i.e., the capacity of MDS-TPIR is known only at the extremes where either T or K c belongs to {1, N}. The focus of this work is a recent conjecture by Freij-Hollanti, Gnilke, Hollanti and Karpuk which offers a general capacity expression for MDS-TPIR. We prove that the conjecture is false by presenting as a counterexample a PIR scheme for the setting (K, N, T, K c) = (2, 4, 2, 2), which achieves the rate 3/5, exceeding the conjectured capacity, 4/7.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) is the problem of retrieving one out of K messages from N distributed servers (each stores all K messages) in such a way that any individual server learns no information about which message is being retrieved. The rate of a PIR scheme is the ratio of the number of bits of the desired message to the total number of bits downloaded from all servers. The supremum of achievable rates is the capacity of PIR. The capacity of PIR was shown in [1] to be
The capacity of several variants of PIR has also since been characterized in [1] , [2] , [3] .
The focus of this work is on a recent conjecture by FreijHollanti, Gnilke, Hollanti and Karpuk (FGHK conjecture, in short) in [4] which offers a capacity expression for a generalized form of PIR, called MDS-TPIR. MDS-TPIR involves two additional parameters: K c and T , which generalize the storage and privacy constraints, respectively. Instead of replication, each message is encoded through an (N, K c ) MDS storage code, so that the information stored at any K c servers is exactly enough to recover all K messages. Privacy must be preserved not just from each individual server, but from any colluding set of up to T servers. MDS-TPIR is a generalization of PIR, because setting both T = 1 and K c = 1 reduces MDS-TPIR to the original PIR problem for which the capacity is already known (see (1) ).
The capacity of MDS-TPIR is known only at the degenerate extremes -when either T or K c takes the value 1 or N . If either T or K c is equal to N then by analogy to the single server setting it follows immediately that the user must download all messages, i.e., the capacity is 1/K. If K c = 1 or T = 1, then the problem specializes to TPIR, and MDS-PIR, respectively. The capacity of TPIR (K c = 1) was shown in [2] to be
The capacity of MDS-PIR (T = 1) was characterized by Banawan and Ulukus in [3] , as
It is notable that K c and T play similar roles in the two capacity expressions. The capacity achieving scheme of Banawan and Ulukus [3] improved upon a scheme proposed earlier by Tajeddine and Rouayheb in [5] . Tajeddine and Rouayheb also proposed an achievable scheme for MDS-TPIR for the T = 2 setting. The scheme was generalized by Freij-Hollanti et al. [4] to the (K, N, T, K c ) setting, T +K c ≤ N , where it achieves the rate 1 − T +Kc−1 N . Remarkably, the rate achieved by this scheme does not depend on the number of messages, K. In support of the plausible asymptotic (K → ∞) optimality of their scheme, and based on the intuition from existing capacity expressions for PIR, MDS-PIR and TPIR, Freij-Hollanti et al. conjecture that if T + K c ≤ N , then the capacity of MDS-TPIR is given by the following expression.
FGHK CONJECTURE [4] :
The conjecture is appealing for its generality and elegance as it captures all four parameters, K, N, T, K c in a compact form. T and K c appear as interchangeable terms, and the capacity expression appears to be a natural extension of the capacity expressions for TPIR and MDS-PIR. Indeed, the conjectured capacity recovers the known capacity of TPIR if we set K c = 1 and that of MDS-PIR if we set T = 1. However, in all nondegenerate cases where T, K c / ∈ {1, N}, the capacity of MDS-TPIR, and therefore the validity of the conjecture is unknown. In fact, in all these cases the problem is open on both sides, i.e., the conjectured capacity expression is neither known to be achievable, nor known to be an outer bound. The lack of any non-trivial outer bounds for MDS-TPIR is also recently highlighted in [6] . This intriguing combination of plausibility, uncertainty and generality of the FGHK conjecture motivates our work. Our contribution is summarized next.
Summary of Contribution: As the main outcome of this work, we disprove the FGHK conjecture. For our counterexample, we consider the setting (K, N, T, K c ) = (2, 4, 2, 2) where the data is stored using the (4, 2) MDS code (x, y) → (x, y, x + y, x + 2y). The conjectured capacity for this setting is 4/7. We show that the rate 3/5 > 4/7 is achievable, thus disproving the conjecture.
Notation:
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
uniform symbols from a finite field F p for a prime p. In p-ary units,
There are N servers. The n th server stores
We require the storage system to satisfy the MDS property, i.e., from the information stored in any K c servers, we can recover each message, i.e.,
Let us use F to denote a random variable privately generated by the user, whose realization is not available to the servers. F represents the randomness in the strategies followed by the user. Similarly, G is a random variable that determines the random strategies followed by the servers, and whose realizations are assumed to be known to all the servers and to the user. The user privately generates θ uniformly from [1 : K] and wishes to retrieve W θ while keeping θ a secret from each server. F and G are generated independently and before the realizations of the messages or the desired message index are known, so that
The user sends query Q [k] n to the n th server, n ∈ [1 : N ]. Upon receiving Q [k] n , the n th server generates an answering string A [k] n , which is a function of the received query Q [k] n , the stored information W 1n , · · · , W Kn and G,
Each server returns to the user its answer A
n . From all the information that is now available at the user (A [k] 1:N , Q [k] 1:N , F, G), the user decodes the desired message W k according to a decoding rule that is specified by the PIR scheme. Let P e denote the probability of error for the specified decoding rule.
To protect the user's privacy, the K strategies must be indistinguishable (identically distributed) from the perspective of any subset T ⊂ [1 : N ] of at most T colluding servers, i.e., the following privacy constraint must be satisfied.
The PIR rate characterizes how many bits of desired information are retrieved per downloaded bit and is defined as R = L/D, where D is the expected value of the total number of bits downloaded by the user from all the servers. A rate R is said to be -error achievable if there exists a sequence of PIR schemes, indexed by L, each of rate greater than or equal to R, for which P e → 0 as L → ∞. Note that for such a sequence of PIR schemes, from Fano's inequality, we must have
where o(L) represents a term whose value approaches zero as L approaches infinity. The supremum of -error achievable rates is called the capacity C.
III. SETTLING THE CONJECTURE
Our main result is stated in the following theorem. Theorem 1: For the MDS-TPIR problem with K = 2 messages, N = 4 servers, T = 2 privacy and the (N, K c ) = (4, 2) MDS storage code (x, y) → (x, y, x + y, x+2y), a rate of 3/5 is achievable. Since the achievable rate exceeds the conjectured capacity of 4/7 for this setting, the FGHK conjecture is false.
Proof: We present a scheme that achieves rate 3/5. We assume that each message is comprised of L = 12 symbols from F p for a sufficiently 3 
A. Storage Code
The storage is specified as
Recall that W kn is the information about message W k that is stored at Server n. Thus, Server 1 stores (a, c), Server 2 stores (b, d), Server 3 stores (a + b, c + d), and Server 4 stores (a + 2b, c + 2d). In particular, each server stores 6 symbols for each message, for a total of 12 symbols per server. Any two servers store just enough information to recover both messages, thus the MDS storage criterion is satisfied.
B. Construction of Queries
The query to each server Q [k] n is comprised of two parts, denoted as Q
n (W 2 ). Each part contains 3 row vectors, also called query vectors, along which the server should project its corresponding stored message symbols.
In preparation for the construction of the queries, let us denote the set of all full rank 6 × 6 matrices over F p as S. The user privately chooses two matrices, S and S , independently and uniformly from S. Label the rows of S as V 1 , V 2 , V 3 , V 4 , V 5 , V 6 , and the rows of S as
U 6 , U 7 , U 8 , U 9 are obtained as follows.
As a preview of what we are trying to accomplish, we note that for Server n ∈ [1 : 4], V n will be used as the query vectors for desired message symbols, while U n will be used as query vectors for undesired message symbols. Since K c = 2, the same query vector V i sent to two different servers will
information for a total of 12 independent desired symbols. On the other hand, for undesired symbols note that U 0 is used as the query vector to all 4 servers, but because K c = 2, it can only produce 2 independent symbols, i.e., 2 of the 4 symbols are redundant. The dependencies introduced via (20),(21) are carefully chosen to ensure that the queries along U 1 , U 2 , U 6 , U 7 will produce only 3 independent symbols. Similarly, the queries along U 3 , U 4 , U 8 , U 9 will produce only 3 independent symbols. Thus, all the queries for the undesired message will produce a total of only 8 independent symbols. The 12 independent desired symbols and 8 independent undesired symbols will be resolved from a total of 12 + 8 = 20 downloaded symbols, to achieve the rate 12/20 = 3/5. To ensure T = 2 privacy, the U i and V i queries will be made indistinguishable from the perspective of any 2 colluding servers. The key to the T = 2 privacy is that any V n , V n , n = n have one element in common. Similarly, any U n , U n , n = n also have one element in common. This is a critical aspect of the construction.
Next we provide a detailed description of the queries and downloads for message W k , k ∈ [1 : 2], both when W k is desired and when it is not desired. To simplify the notation, we will denote W k = (x; y). Note that when k = 1, (x; y) = (a; b) and when k = 2, (x; y) = (c; d).
1) Case 1. W k is Desired:
The query sent to Server n is a 3 × 6 matrix whose rows are the 3 vectors in V n . The ordering of the rows is uniformly random, i.e.,
is equally likely to return any one of the 6 possibilities: 
Define k c = 3 − k as the complement of k, i.e., k c = 1 if k = 2 and vice versa. The answers A [k] n to be sent to the user will be constructed by combining A
since separately sending these answers will be too inefficient. The details of this combining process will be specified later. Next we note an important property of the construction.
Desired Symbols Are Independent: We show that if the user can recover A full rank (invertible) and the user knows V 1:6 , he recovers all symbols in x and y (thus W k ).
2) Case 2. W k is Undesired: Similarly, the query sent to Server n is a 3 × 6 matrix whose rows are the 3 vectors in U n . The ordering of the rows is uniformly random for each n, and independent across all n ∈ [1 : 4].
Each server projects its stored W kn symbols along the 3 query vectors to obtain,
Interfering Symbols Have Dimension 8: + 2y) . We now show that these 12 symbols are dependent and have dimension only 8. 4 Because of (20) and (21), we have
Thus, of the 12 symbols recovered from A 1:4 (W k ) contains no more than 8 dimensions. The number of dimensions is also not less than 8 because, the following 8 undesired symbols (two symbols from each server) are independent, Server 1 :
Server 2 : U 0 y, U 9 y = (U 3 + 2U 4 )y Server 3 :
To see that the 8 symbols are independent, we add 4 new symbols (U 1 x, U 3 y, U 5 x, U 5 y) such that from the 12 symbols, we can recover all 12 undesired symbols (S x, S y). Since the 4 new symbols cannot span more than 4 dimensions, the original 8 symbols must occupy at least 8 dimensions.
C. Combining Answers for Efficient Download
Based on the queries, each server has 3 linear combinations of symbols of W 1 in A [k] n (W 1 ) and 3 linear combinations of symbols of W 2 in A [k] n (W 2 ) for a total of 12 linear combinations of desired symbols and 12 linear combinations of undesired symbols across all servers. However, recall that there are only 8 independent linear combinations of undesired symbols. This is a fact that can be exploited to improve the efficiency of download. Specifically, we will combine the 6 queried symbols (i.e., the 6 linear combinations) from each server into 5 symbols to be downloaded by the user. Intuitively, 5 symbols from each server will give the user a total of 20 symbols, from which he can resolve the 12 desired and 8 undesired symbols.
The following function maps 6 queried symbols to 5 downloaded symbols.
Note that the first four symbols are directly downloaded and only the last symbol is mixed. The desired and undesired symbols are combined to produce the answers as follows.
where C n are deterministic 3 × 3 matrices, that are required to satisfy the following two properties. Denote the first 2 rows of C n as C n . P1. All C n are full rank. P2. For all (3!) 4 distinct realizations of π n , n ∈ [1 : 4], the 8 linear combinations of the undesired message symbols that are directly downloaded (2 from each server),
It is not difficult to find matrices that satisfy these properties. In fact, these properties are 'generic', i.e., uniformly random choices of C n matrices will satisfy these properties with probability approaching 1 as the field size approaches infinity. For the particular setting of Theorem 1, based on a brute force search we find the following explicit choice of C n , n ∈ [1 : 4] which satisfies both properties over F 349 . 
Property P 1 is trivially verified. Property P 2 is verified by considering one by one, all of the 6 4 distinct realizations of π n , n ∈ [1 : 4] . To show how this is done, let us consider one case here. Suppose the realization of the permutations is such that
then we have 
The determinant of C over F 349 is 321. Since the determinant is non-zero, all of its 8 rows are linearly independent. Note that the test for property P 2 does not depend on the realizations of U i vectors. To see why this is true, note that the 8 linear combinations of (x, y) in the rightmost column vector of (33) are linearly independent. Therefore, if C is an invertible matrix then the 8 directly downloaded linear combinations on the LHS of (33) are also independent (have joint entropy 8 p-ary units, conditioned on U 0:9 ).
At this point the construction of the scheme is complete. All that remains now is to prove that the scheme is correct, i.e., it retrieves the desired message, and that it is T = 2 private.
D. The Scheme is Correct (Retrieves Desired Message)
As noted previously, the first 4 variables in the output of the L function are obtained directly, i.e., C 1 A
4 (W k c ) are linearly independent. Since we have recovered 8 independent dimensions of interference, and interference only spans 8 dimensions, all interference is recovered and eliminated. Once the interference is eliminated, since the 12 desired symbols are independent and since the C n matrices have full rank, the user is left with 12 independent linear combinations of desired symbols, from which he is able to recover the 12 desired message symbols. Therefore the scheme is correct.
E. The Scheme is Private (to any T = 2 Colluding Servers)
To prove that the scheme is T = 2 private (refer to (11)), it suffices to show that the queries for any 2 servers are identically distributed, regardless of which message is desired. Since each query is made up of two independently generated parts, one for each message, it suffices to prove that the query vectors to any two servers for a message (say W k ) are identically distributed regardless of whether the message is desired or undesired, i.e., ∀n 1 
Therefore, it suffices to show the following.
where
Because S is uniformly chosen from the set of all full rank matrices, we have
Next we note that there is a bijection between 
Finally, we note that S and S are identically distributed, so
Combining (36), (38) and (39), we arrive at (35) and (34).
F. Rate achieved is 3/5
The rate achieved is 12/20 = 3/5, because we download 20 symbols in total (5 from each server) and the desired message size is 12 symbols.
IV. DISCUSSION
We settle a conjecture on the capacity of MDS-TPIR by Freij-Hollanti et al. [4] by constructing a scheme that beats the conjectured capacity for one particular instance of MDS-TPIR. Beyond the result presented here, the extended version of this paper (available on Arxiv:1701.07807) shows that 3/5 is also the best possible rate that can be achieved by any linear scheme for the same setting. Further, the insights from the achievability and converse arguments allow us to characterize the exact capacity of various instances of MDS-TPIR. This includes all cases with (K, N, T, K c ) = (2, N, T, N − 1), where N and T can be arbitrary. The capacity for these cases turns out to be C = N 2 −N 2N 2 −3N +T . Through another counterexample, we are also able to prove that the capacity expression cannot be symmetric in T and K c parameters, i.e., these parameters cannot be interchangeable in general. Nevertheless, the general capacity expression for MDS-TPIR remains unknown.
